The Political Economy of Institutional Change: A Distribution Criterion for Acceptance of Groundwater Rules by Nunn, Susan Christopher
Volume 25 
Issue 4 Symposium on International Resources Law 
Fall 1985 
The Political Economy of Institutional Change: A Distribution 
Criterion for Acceptance of Groundwater Rules 
Susan Christopher Nunn 
Recommended Citation 
Susan C. Nunn, The Political Economy of Institutional Change: A Distribution Criterion for Acceptance of 
Groundwater Rules, 25 Nat. Resources J. 867 (1985). 
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol25/iss4/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more 
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu. 
SUSAN CHRISTOPHER NUNN*
The Political Economy of
Institutional Change: A Distribution
Criterion for Acceptance of
Groundwater Rules
INTRODUCTION
Economic growth in an arid region ebbs and flows, like ecological
growth, to the rhythms of water. Again and again water has been the
factor constraining growth in the American West, and again and again
westerners have turned to the public sector for new rules, new institutions,
and material assistance to relax that constraint. During the first century
of western development westerners built new institutions and physical
infrastructure to increase the supply of water. Today the best sources of
new supply have been developed. The current water issue is one of
reallocation of available supplies among competing demands. 1 Proposals
for institutional change that will facilitate that reallocation are as abundant
in the West as water is scarce. Reallocation of water, however, means
redistribution of wealth among water claimants, and redistribution means
some claimants will lose and others will gain. The spontaneity with which
the water supply institutions were created is a thing of the past and each
proposal for change is bogged down in the resistance of the prospective
losers.
The redistributional effects of rule change are typically neglected in
the economic theory that supports the proposals of economic policy ad-
visors. Since resistance to redistribution is a major impediment to change,
this neglect weakens the usefulness of economic analysis for policy pur-
poses. This article attempts to sketch an approach to the integration of
redistribution into economic analysis. The approach is illustrated by the
historical development of groundwater institutions in two southwestern
states, New Mexico and Texas. The first section gives some perspective
on the social and economic environment of groundwater institutions through
*Assistant Professor, Department of Hydrology and Water Resources, University of Arizona. I
am grateful to Dan Bromley and Ron Cummings for their careful criticism of the analysis in this
paper, and for the help of Jennifer Davis and Charles Reed in making the exposition clearer.
Responsibility for the results is my own.
1. For a study of reallocation that focuses on market transfers of water, see Brown, McDonald,
Tysseling & DuMars, Water Reallocation, Market Proficiency, and Conflicting Social Values, WATER
AND AGRICULTURE IN THE WESTERN U.S.: CONSERVATION, REALLOCATION, AND MARKETS 193-265
(G. Weatherford, ed. 1982).
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a brief overview of the development of western water institutions gen-
erally. The second summarizes the institutional deficiencies of contem-
porary groundwater rules through economic analysis. The third introduces
an objective approach to rules as they influence and are influenced by
interest groups. The final section addresses the role of the irrigated ag-
riculture interests in the formation of property rules in southwestern
groundwater.
EVOLUTION OF WESTERN WATER INSTITUTIONS
Surface Water Institutions
The first western miners and irrigators on the public domain met their
need for secure water claims with informal collective agreements that
rights in water would be observed on a "first in time is first in right"
basis, a once private arrangement that was publicly approved by the state
courts and by the federal Desert Land Act.2 Once the "easy" homesteads,
where irrigation could be developed by individual farmers, became sat-
urated with irrigators, mutual irrigation companies and irrigation devel-
opment corporations were formed to share the higher development costs
of larger water projects.' When irrigators turned to still higher-cost proj-
ects that were not profitable enough or safe enough for private investors,
states authorized irrigation districts and gave them the power to condemn
water rights, issue bonds, and levy taxes to construct irrigation projects.'
Irrigators exhorted the states themselves to undertake the projects that
were too large for the limited local irrigation district's capacity to bond
and tax.' Between 1890 and 1935, Colorado, Wyoming, and Idaho all
built state-financed reservoirs to store and distribute irrigation water.6
2. See Weil, Public Policy in Western Water Decisions, I CAL. L. REV. 11-31 (1912) on the
history of prior appropriations. The Desert Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1976) provided:
that the right to the use of water . . . shall depend upon bona fide prior appropriation; and
such right shall not exceed the amount of water actually appropriated ... and all surplus water
over and above such actual appropriation and use. . . upon the public lands and not navigable,
shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public for irrigation, mining,
and manufacturing purposes subject to existing rights.
3. See R. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RGTrrs IN WESTERN WATERS (1983); see generally Maas &
Anderson .... AND THE DESERT SHALL REJOICE: CONFLICT, GROWTH AND JUSTICE IN ARID ENVI-
RONMENTS 146-364 (1978).
4. California's Wright Act of 1887, CAL. WATER CODE § 20500 (West 1984) was the first au-
thorization of an irrigation district with public powers; by 1969 there were 469 irrigation districts
irrigating 7,192,781 acres in the seventeen western states. DUNBAR, supra note 3, at 34.
5. The Carey Act of 1894, 43 U.S.C. § 641 (1976), gave each arid state the right to choose one
million acres of land and control its irrigation and settlement. 1,065,195 acres were eventually
patented under the Cary Act, mostly in Wyoming and Idaho. Id. at 39-42.
6. In Wyoming, where Buffalo Bill Cody was president of the company that built the second
Carey Act project, thirty-two projects were built under the Carey Act by 1938, and 222,071 acres
were patented. In Idaho, 614,894 acres were patented. Id. at 41, 42. Colorado's projects were built
before the Carey Act, without federal participation. McKendrick, Before the Newlands Act: State
Sponsored Reclamation Projects in Colorado, 1888-1903, 52 COLO. MAG. 1-21 (1975).
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Even the states found the scale of many of the most promising water
storage projects beyond their capacity to finance through bond issue.7 In
1902 the Newlands Act established the Bureau of Reclamation and com-
mitted the federal government to an active role in physical augmentation
of the water supply of the West.'
The rise in the role of the central government during and after the
second world war, accompanied by the Keynesian revolution in economic
thought, created an intellectual environment of high confidence in the
ability of the central government to solve economic problems. The federal
role, originally to provide capital for projects beyond the investment
capacity of the private sector, increasingly became one of directing and
coordinating the use of water in the public interest. 9 In economics, this
era saw the flowering of cost-benefit analysis, the identification of optimal
time paths for using exhaustible resources, and work on regulatory schemes
to adjust the behavior of firms in areas like waste disposal where the
market was not effective."0 This "resource-management" approach to
policy concentrated on market failure, the cases where markets are ex-
pected to produce systematically inefficient results, and proposed ad-
justment mechanisms to be imposed by the government that would restore
efficiency.
By the 1960s, the difficulties of central administration of water supply
decisions began to become apparent. Centralization imposes tremendous
fact-finding responsibility on the decisionmaker. Information about in-
dividual values is particularly difficult for a public decisionmaker to ac-
quire." The public decisionmaking process also offers an opportunity for
private interests to influence the direction of government policy to achieve
private gains in ways contrary to the public purpose. The struggle to find
answers to the unwieldy informational and administrative problems of
centralized decisionmaking has resulted in a renewal of respect for the
market as a public decisionmaking system. 2 Many contemporary econ-
7. California, for example, planned to finance the Central Valley Project on a state level, and the
Central Valley Project Act of 1933, Cal. Water Code § 11100 (West 1984), authorized the issuance
of $170 million in bonds for this purpose. The state could not find buyers, and asked the Bureau
of Reclamation to take over the project in 1935. DUNBAR, supra note 3, at 44.
8. The Newlands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 371 (1976); P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND DEVELOPMENT
654-56 (1968).
9. See Subcomm. on Benefits and Costs, Federal Inter-Agency River Basin Comm., Proposed
Practices for Economic Analysis of River Basin Projects (1950, revised May, 1958) (the federal
"Green Book").
10. See 0. ECKSTEIN, WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT (1958); R. MCKEAN, EFFICIENCY IN Gov-
ERNMENT THROUGH SYSTEMS ANALYSIS (1958); J. HIRSHLEIFER, J. DEHAVEN, & J. MILLIMAN, WATER
SUPPLY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLICY (1960).
11. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 527 (Sept. 1945).
12. JoINT COMM. ON ECONOMICS, 91St CONG., 1st SEss., THE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES: THE PPB SYSTEM (The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent
to the Choice of Market versus Nonmarket Allocation 47) (Joint Comm. Print 1969).
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omists are looking for ways to use the high-quality information-gathering
and processing qualities of the market in public decisions over water,
which is commonly viewed as outside the market's domain."
Western Groundwater Institutions
Groundwater use was not caught up in the shift toward centralized
decisionmaking of the 1940s and 1950s. The groundwater resource was
relatively new, having become economically important only after the
development of the cheap gasoline engine and the deep well turbine pump
in the 1940s. In addition, groundwater is naturally adapted to exploitation
by individual investors rather than through the large water projects that
harnessed, stored, and distributed the surface waters of the West. Eco-
nomic policy did not turn its attention to the groundwater resource until
surface waters were fully developed.
The rules over groundwater use have been made on the state level,
usually in the courts. In most western states, the courts applied the eastern
doctrine of "absolute ownership" to groundwater pumping.' 4 Under ab-
solute ownership, any landowner has the privilege to sink a well on his
or her own land and pump water from it, if there is water to be found. "5
Absolute ownership is not really a water right at all, but a pumping
privilege. A right is defined by the duties of others to respect the right;
the prior appropriation right is as good as the duties of junior appropriators
to forbear from taking water until the prior right is satisfied. 6 No one
has a duty to protect the water of an absolute owner; the absolute owner's
neighbors may pump the water out from under the land at their discretion.
In fact absolute ownership makes the groundwater resource a common
pool, in which all overlying landowners have a pumping privilege.
The absolute ownership doctrine proved to be poorly adapted to ground-
water mining in an arid agricultural environment, however. Arid lands
were productive and profitable under pump-irrigation, irrigated acreage
spread, and in many areas water levels declined precipitously. The threat
13. T. ANDERSON, WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT (1983); T. ANDERSON, WATER CRISIS: ENDING THE POLICY DROUGHT (1983).
14. Acton v. Blundell, 12 Meeson & Welsby 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (1843); Meeker v. City
of East Orange, 77 N.J.L. 623, 74 A. 379 (1909); Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. East, 98 Tex. 146,
81 S.W. 279 (1904).
15. In the United States, the absolute ownership rule has been qualified by the rule of "reasonable
use," that the use must be such as to reasonably benefit the overlying land. Evans v. City of Seattle,
182 Wash. 450, 47 P.2d 984 (1935); Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring Water Co., 339 Pa. 129, 14 A.2d
87 (1940); Bristor v. Cheatham, 75 Ariz. 227, 255 P.2d 173 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Bristor II];
and by the "correlative rights rule" of California that where there are disputes between overlying
landowners as to groundwater, each shall receive a fair and just proportion. Katz v. Walkinshaw,
141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903).
16. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE
L.J. 16, 31-32 (1913).
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of rapid depletion of the great groundwater resources of the West became
apparent not long after the resource became important, and the attention
of the West was called to the groundwater stock and to its importance to
sustained growth in the region. In areas of intense groundwater use-on
the High Plains of Texas and the desert lowlands of Arizona, for example,
there has been widespread concern since the 1950s that the resource was
being ill-used. In many cases, however, that concern was not translated
into effective institutional change. 7 The debate over what form a ground-
water management rule should take still proceeds, more than thirty years
later, and the pumps are still pumping.
INEFFICIENT WATER USE AND GROUNDWATER LAW
The attack on current groundwater rules focuses on their inefficiency.
The absolute ownership privilege fails to give groundwater users good
signals of the true costs and benefits of the water they are pumping. There
are three sources of poor signaling under absolute ownership: the common
pool externality, the public good nature of pumping lifts, and the lack of
means to transfer water claims."8
Groundwater is a "common pool" resource under the absolute own-
ership rule, meaning that the common supply is exploited by independent
individuals. Each unit of water pumped in excess of recharge has a scarcity
cost because it depletes future supplies. The absolute owners do not suffer
the scarcity cost of their own pumping, however, since future scarcity
will be shared among all users of the common pool. Because it is imposed
by the pumper on third parties (neighboring pumpers), the scarcity cost
is called an "external" cost of pumping. Since the absolute owner will
not pay the cost, a pumper who is economically "rational" will not count
it as a cost. Each pumper, then, treats the stock as though it were not
scarce, or as though it had zero price, with the result that the resource
is inefficiently overused.
The groundwater stock also produces savings in pumping costs by
holding the water being pumped closer the land surface, which reduces
17. In Arizona, for example, the Supreme Court rejected the common law doctrine of absolute
ownership in 1952, declaring the groundwater of Arizona to be the property of the public and subject
to prior appropriation, on the basis that absolute ownership results in misuse of a precious resource.
The majority opinion in Bristor v. Cheatham, 73 Ariz. 228, 240 P.2d 185, 190 (1952) [hereinafter
cited as Bristor I] expressly says: "To permit the present underground water race to continue unabated,
without regulation or control, would inevitably lead to exhaustion of the underground supply and
consequently to economic disaster."
However, the Arizona court reversed itself the following year, supporting its reaffirmation of
absolute ownership by reference to its duty to protect the "many and large investments [which] have
been made in the development of groundwaters." Bristor II, 75 Ariz. 227, 255 P.2d at 231 (1953).
18. For a general picture of the common-pool externality, see HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 10, at 59-
66.
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pumping costs. This cost-savings is a collective consumption good for
all pumpers, because all pumpers enjoy the benefits of lower drilling and
pumping costs due to the effect on the water-table of the stock of ground-
water in storage. And, non-contributors to the stored stock cannot be
excluded from its benefits. While all pumpers together might find it
worthwhile to "contribute" to the maintenance of water in the aquifer in
order to reduce pumping costs, no individual pumper's contribution will
make a significant difference in his or her own pumping costs. The result
is that independent actors have no incentive to contribute, and the col-
lective benefits of maintaining stock to reduce lifts are not realized. Lifts
are allowed to increase at an inefficiently rapid rate. 9
Finally, the distribution of water among competing users will be in-
efficient if the right to use water is not transferable. Landowners who
have an absolute ownership privilege cannot sell their water right to an
enterprise which has a higher-valued use, so that groundwater which
could be used more productively is trapped in low-valued uses.
Both the resource-manager and the advocate of the market argue that
the policies they propose will promote efficiency in water use. The re-
source-management approach is to adjust the decisions of individual users
to conform with efficiency criteria by imposing use-taxes or pumping
quotas or by establishing a centralized decisionmaking mechanism that
produces efficient decisions.2° The free-market economist would divide
the water stock among users and privatize and quantify rights so that
individual decision makers are responsible for the social costs of their
pumping." These private rights are advocated in the name of their effi-
ciency.
Public policy has taken neither approach. Public decisionmakers, even
when they are given efficiency guidelines by able economists of the
resource-management school, continue to allocate water in response to
political criteria. Privatization schemes that would promote a free water
market fail time and again in courts and legislatures. In fact, judged by
results, efficiency is not an important criterion for public decisions.
Efficiency as a Goal of Public Policy
Public decisions come about in response to collective action by inter-
ested parties who want some problem solved. In the West, the problem
is frequently water. Irrigators, growing cities, and industry want water,
19. The dynamics of contribution to the provision of a nonexcludable public good (a collective
consumption good) are explored in M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).
20. See Burt & Cummings, Natural Resource Management, the Steady State, and Approximately
Optimal Decision Rules, 53 LAND ECON. 1, 16-19 (1977).
21. See ANDERSON, supra note 13.
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not efficiency. The lack of water has often been the only constraint to
exploitation of a resource-rich and essentially underdeveloped region. In
their study of the water politics of Arizona, Ingram, Martin, and Laney
describe this attitude.
Whatever the development of water supply is estimated to cost,
Westerners tend to think it is worth the price. They believe that if
water becomes too expensive, everything else will become yet more
dear, and were they to lack a sufficient supply of this basic ingredient,
they would be unable to reap the profits that come with enterprise
and development. In short, water is conceived by Westerners as a
coveted commodity, a worthy prize for which they are willing to
engage in demanding political games, where pay-offs may come only
far into the future. 2
In the West, where individuals could effectively get access to water,
they simply took what they needed and created the doctrine of prior
appropriation to confirm their right to have done so. Where the formation
of private cooperative ventures was necessary, such ventures were formed.
Where public assistance was needed, irrigators lobbied the public until
it was forthcoming. Whatever was necessary to bring forth the water was
undertaken.
The free-market school in water economics views the recourse of in-
terest groups like the western irrigation movement to the collective purse
as a subversion of the public purpose. Alfred G. Cuzdn, in an article
titled "Appropriators versus Expropriators," states:
Water policies at the local, state and 'federal levels tend to redis-
tribute income and wealth from the mass of the public to the ruling
class of politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups . . . Though
struggles take place within this class and though new groups and
individuals may join it, the general tendency is for the class to benefit
at the expense of the public, who subsidize the programs, projects,
and policies with their taxes.23
But the public sector is, and is meant to be, the means for special
interest groups to get needs met that are not satisfied in the private sector.
In general the effect is, and is meant to be, redistributive. If the market
is the forum in which individual decisionmakers pursue their interests
independently within the wealth constraints imposed by the rule structure,
the political arena is the forum in which classes of people pursue their
22. Ingram, Martin & Laney, A Willingness to Pay: Analysis of Water Resources Development in
Arizona, WATER AND AGRICULTURE IN THE WESTERN U.S.: CONSERVATION, REALLOCATION, AND
MARKETS 137-255 (G. Weatherford, ed. 1982).
23. Cuzd.n, Appropriators versus Expropriators: The Political Economy of Water in the West,
WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, 13-43 (T.
Anderson, ed. 1983).
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interests collectively by changing the wealth constraints imposed by the
rule structure. Both the public and the private sector serve special inter-
ests. The private sector serves in proportion to an individual's command
over the market: wealth. The public sector serves in proportion to col-
lective command over public decisionmaking: influence, votes, and power.
Economists have sought to separate public decisions on distribution of
wealth from those which affect efficiency, and to claim expertise in the
realm of efficiency. 24 Public policy, however, is collective action by more
or less self-interested individuals. There is no model of individual or
collective psychology which supports a view of individuals as concerned
with efficiency for its own sake. By isolating itself from the distributional
issue, economics has shut itself off from the concerns of public policy.25
The distributional blind spot of economists becomes critical when eco-
nomics addresses comparative property institutions. A property institu-
tion, the rule of absolute ownership, for example, has qualities that affect
efficiency like those described above. In addition, the rule will affect the
distribution of claims on the resource. A rule change, even one that
promotes efficiency, is unappealing to those who will suffer distributional
losses, no matter how large the improvement in efficiency as a result of
the change.
THE DISTRIBUTION-OF-BENEFITS CRITERION AND FEASIBLE
RULES
The use of efficiency standards to measure the goodness of an institution
or a public policy implies that efficiency is an objective of public policy.
As discussed above, there is no obvious justification for this assertion.
A theory of the public sector is needed to evaluate the role of efficiency
in public policy. Such a theory should explain how and when rational
individuals are motivated to join together in a collective or public scheme
and under what conditions rational individuals will conform to the pre-
scriptions of a collective scheme once it has been established. Without
an understanding of the relation of individual motivation to the collective
scheme, "public purpose" has no meaning.
24. See W. BAUMOL, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE 161-72 (1967).
25. D.W. Bromley points up the logical fallacy in the attempt to separate efficiency and distri-
bution, saying:
we have no scientific way of concluding that an inefficient allocation of resources in the status
quo is less preferred than an attainable efficient allocation under a new institutional structure
. . . property arrangements determine access to income streams; the political process is, to
some extent, a tussle over such streams. Since there is no divine authority to whom we might
appeal for guidance on the appropriate income stream for each member of society, the problem
reduces to one of taste and political expediency.
Bromley, Land and Water Problems: An Institutional Perspective, 65 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 839
(1982).
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To illustrate the problem of public ranking of "efficient" rules relative
to those which are not, consider the following simplified situation. Sup-
pose the water resources of the West are absolutely fixed in quantity, and
can be applied to only two distinct types of production, household uses
by city dwellers and irrigated agriculture, both of which operate under
diminishing returns. Let rural incomes be the value of irrigated agricul-
ture's production and let the value of household water consumption rep-
resent the value of the resource to the urban sector, so that the distribution
of claims on water is equivalent to the distribution of wealth. The max-
imum output from the resource in each sector, for all possible allocations
of the fixed water supply between the sectors, is represented in Figure
1. The boundary of this "production transformation curve" is convex
because of the assumption of diminishing returns. Any division of water
acre-feet
in
municipal
uses
acre-feet
in
irrigated
-agriculture
FIGURE 1.
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between the irrigation sector and the household sector that lies inside the
transformation curve is attainable. Any distribution that lies outside the
curve is unattainable. Those combinations of crops and water deliveries
that lie on the curve give the maximum value of water production for the
fixed resource, and are therefore efficient.
Suppose the city/farm water distribution represented by point B is the
mix that would result from the absolute ownership doctrine. Because of
external costs and the inability to make transfers, point B lies well inside
the transformation curve. The region could have more of both irrigated
crops and urban water deliveries even with the limited supply of water.
Compare point B with point A, which is efficient, and suppose point A
is associated with a market allocation of water between cities and farms.
It cannot be said, objectively, that point A is better than point B on the
basis of its efficiency. 26 If the preservation of the agricultural sector is an
important public objective, point B may be publically preferred. In fact,
though point A is efficient and point B is not, the two points, and implicitly
the institutions that support them, cannot be compared objectively.
Of course, there are points on the frontier like those between C and
D which are unambiguously better than B. If there is an institutional
arrangement or a public policy that supports C, for example, it can
objectively be said that the C-institution is better than the B-institution.
However, not all points on the frontier can be supported by a low-cost
institution that is consistent with more general social rules. The points
between C and D may or may not be achievable under available insti-
tutional technologies. If agricultural interests are strong enough to retain
the institutions that support point B under pressure from all who prefer
point A, any proposal for an institutional change to a privatized free-
market water rule will fail. A group which can, on its own, guarantee
that a particular rule or allocation prevails, is said to be effective for that
rule or allocation. If agriculture is effective for absolute ownership, farm-
ers would have to expect returns at least as good as those at B before
they would consider permitting a rule change.
The ability of individuals to act collectively to promote or block a
change in rules suggests a collective distribution-of-benefits requirement
for rule changes.27 This is not an equity-type requirement. The reasoning
26. Id. at 838.
Since the essence of different institutional arrangements is to create alternative access
to income streams-and to make some better off and others worse off (at least relatively
speaking)--there can be no scientific basis for comparing two allocations existing
witfiin two different institutional settings.
27. It may be instructive to compare this requirement with the one put forward by Harold Demsetz.
The Demsetz paradigm is "property rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of
internalization become larger than the cost of internalization." Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property
Rights, 57 AM. EcON. REv. 347, 350 (1967). The conclusion drawn from the paradigm is that
privatization of property rights will or should occur when the scarcity value of the resource becomes
large relative to the costs of privatizing rights. The difference between the distribution-of-benefits
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is more like the reasoning behind the market transaction: A buyer will
buy only if what is purchased is worth more to the buyer than what is
given up. A group with a common interest that is powerful enough to
prevent a change will permit the change only if their share under the
change is at least as good as that before the change took place.
A rule has at least three dimensions. It allocates claims on income
flows and costs; it gives specific persons the authority to make decisions
that affect income flows and costs; and it sets the conditions for its own
modification. Each of these dimensions affects the distribution of wealth
and power. The collective distribution-of-benefits conditions for rule change
would apply to all three dimensions.
To illustrate, return to Figure 1. Suppose that a group, say the pump
irrigation sector, is effective for point B, the absolute ownership rule.
What must the net benefits to agriculture under an alternative rule be for
farmers to give point B up? Absolute ownership gives the landowner a
claim on all income that can be created by the use of the water beneath
his or her land, so long as there is water beneath the land. On the cost
side, the landowner is exposed to the costs of the depletion of the stock
by other landowners. If pump-irrigators are effective for point B, an
alternative rule must offer farmers incomes net of costs at least as great
as these expected under absolute ownership. Since by presumption the
resource is being operated inefficiently (B is inside the frontier), a more
"efficient" rule would improve net benefits to the irrigation farmers unless
it diverts income away from the agricultural sector by giving cities a
greater share in the income flows.
The second dimension of the rule, the authority to make decisions on
resource use, is an element of wealth just as the claim on income flows
is. Under absolute ownership, a landowner has complete discretion over
when to irrigate, what lands to irrigate, and how intensively to irrigate.
The flexibility that comes with this discretion may itself be very valuable
in adjusting to changes in prices and in weather conditions. On the cost
side, the absolute owner lacks the authority to guarantee that there will
be water available in the future with which to irrigate. The increased
security of future supplies that might be achieved through privatization
or regulation is also valuable. However, pump-irrigators will not support
an alternative rule designed to increase security of future water availability
if it strips the landowner of discretion and authority that is valued more
highly than the future security.
The authority to influence future rule change is the third dimension of
a rule. In the view of many legal scholars of the 1940s and 1950s, the
absolute ownership doctrine gave landowners a real property right that
criterion and the Demsetz paradigm is that the former places a requirement on the distribution of
gains and costs among individuals under the property right, while the Demsetz criterion applies only
to total gains.
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could not be taken from them by state action without the payment of
compensation.28 Suppose absolute ownership is associated with point B,
and cities propose a rule which will result in the universally-preferred
point E. Suppose that under this rule farmers give up the absolute own-
ership rule and receive a reduction in property taxes large enough to
compensate for the total loss suffered by the agricultural sector due to
the loss of the absolute ownership rule. The tax policy of the community,
however, is made by representatives of the community overall, and is
subject to change at the discretion of a majority of the community, while
absolute ownership is not. Rational farmers may not be willing to give
up their influence over rule change, which is itself a kind of security over
future claims on income, even if they are compensated for their other
losses. Farmers know that the cities may change their tax policy sometime
in the future.
When the collective nature of public policy is made explicit, even in
this rudimentary way, the reason that efficiency is not an important cri-
terion in public decisions becomes more clear. Since an efficient scheme
cannot be objectively compared to an inefficient one unless all parties do
better under the efficient version, the social choice of B over A cannot
be said to be a poor choice. However, if a group is known to be effective
for a rule with an inefficient allocation, a search for acceptable improve-
ments within the BCD area would be universally profitable. The presence
of such benefits can be said to be a force driving collective action towards
efficient rules only if efficient rules exist which satisfy the distributional
criterion and which can be implemented with sufficiently low adminis-
trative costs that the benefits net of the cost of administering the rule are
still positive.29
28. When the New Mexico legislation making groundwater the property of the public and subject
to appropriation was tested in the New Mexico Supreme Court, Yeo v. Tweedy, 34 N.M. 611, 286
P. 970 (1929), the court acknowledged that if the ownership of land carried with it a vested property
right in the underlying waters, "Various provisions of the state and Federal Constitution obviously
challenge the power of the Legislature to take or impair such rights in favor of others whose situation
is similar except in the matter of earlier appropriation to beneficial use." Id. at 614, 286 P. at 971.
However, the court found that in New Mexico the ownership of land had never carried with it a
vested property right in the underlying water. Id. at 620-21, 286 P. at 974. In Bristor II, the court
is specifically silent as to whether the absolute ownership interest in groundwater is property in the
sense of the taking clause. Bristor H, 75 Ariz. 227, 255 P.2d 173.
It is claimed that if we do not change the law, groundwaters will be exhausted and
the legislature is shackled and powerless to enact a groundwater code. If the legislature
is shackled, it is the constitution that imposes the impediment. The court has no right
to pull the rug from under the owner and release the constitutional obstructions if
any. . . . Possibly the only source of power the legislature possesses is the police
power for the general welfare. . . . We do not mean to say whether or to what extent
such police power may be used to affect the rights herein.
Id. at 234-35, 255 P.2d at 177-78.
29. This is equivalent to the Demsetz paradigm, with the additional constraint that rules exist
which produce claims on income flows satisfying the distribution-of-benefits criterion. See infra note
32.
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AN APPLICATION TO GROUNDWATER INSTITUTIONS
The collective distribution-of-benefits criterion modifies on the tradi-
tional economic approaches, whether resource-management or free-mar-
ket, in two ways. It introduces a socio-political feasibility condition for
rule change, and it indicates that the efficiency standard can only compare
alternatives that meet the feasibility condition. Does the distribution-of-
benefits criterion change the conclusions of traditional economic analysis
of rules or institutions? This final section attempts to show that it does.
The institutional problem faced by co-users of a common pool, a
groundwater aquifer for example, is often illustrated with an anecdote
called the prisoners' dilemma, a story about two prisoners suspected of
armed robbery. According to the story, the police have insufficient evi-
dence to convict the pair of the felony, which carries a ten-year sentence,
but can get a conviction against each for possession of firearms, which
carries a one-year sentence. The two prisoners are separated and each is
offered the following proposition: Turn state's evidence and you can go
free, while your friend goes away for the full ten years. Each knows,
however, that if both confess, both will be convicted of the felony, and
each will get only a four-year reduction of the sentence for their coop-
eration. That is, if both confess, each will serve six years. Since if each
individual acts independently, both will confess and each will serve six
years, the rule "never confess" will benefit both prisoners, who would
serve only a year apiece. For each prisoner, however, conforming to the
rule exposes the conformer to betrayal by the partner, and a ten year
term. Since betrayal is the most attractive action for the partner, the
exposure is a real threat.3°
If all co-users of a common pool are in precisely the same situation
geologically and economically, pumping from a common aquifer is like
a prisoner's dilemma. Suppose the aquifer is like a bathtub so that all
pumps draw from the same depth and the effects of each pump are
immediately felt by all pumpers simultaneously. Suppose also that only
pump-irrigators draw from the aquifer. Each pumper acting independently
does best by choosing a rate of pumping so that the last acre-foot pumped
produces zero net internal returns. However, since each acre-foot pumped
creates external future scarcity costs, the last water pumped by each farmer
has negative net social returns, with the result that total net returns to the
resource and therefore the net returns to every user of the resource are
lower than the maximum. Like the prisoners, all farmers can improve
over their best independent choice by binding themselves to a rule not
to exercise their best choice.
There is a considerable literature on the rules that will stabilize a
30. For an in-depth review of the history and present status of prisoners' dilemma theory, see R.
HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982).
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prisoners' dilemma situation. Penalties for violation of the rule may be
imposed and, if they are sufficiently severe to counteract the appeal of
violation, the rule will be stabilized.3 If the prisoners expect to meet
again in a similar situation, the value of building trust may be great
enough to get them to follow the rule in the present encounter.32 This is
particularly true for a situation that is expected to be repeated an infinite
number of times. 33 Common property agreements, in other words, may
be stable even without heavy penalties if the external costs are large
relative to the gains from violation and if the agreement is expected to
cover a relationship over an indefinitely long future.
Under this analogy, when a groundwater resource is being exploited
without a system of enforced rules that would internalize or regulate the
future scarcity externality, the existence of social losses is presumed. The
resource-management approach is to impose regulations or use-taxes on
groundwater withdrawals to bring pumping down to the level where net
social returns are at a maximum. The regulation would improve net
incomes for all of the homogeneous farmers on the common pool. The
free-market approach is to define property rights in both the groundwater
stock and in recharge flows, and to vest these rights in the individual
farmers, who would then have to bear their own future scarcity costs,
and would count these as internal costs of pumping.3
New Mexico
The development of the New Mexico law of prior appropriation in
groundwater follows the prisoners' dilemma archetype and provides an
illustration of the collective action nature of rule change. The first law
of groundwater in New Mexico was the common law of absolute own-
ership. 5 In the early years of agricultural development in the state, the
absolute ownership rule presented no serious problems. Percolating
groundwater was not an important water source in New Mexico before
the mid-1930s, though its potential was recognized earlier than that. Fuel
and capital costs were high; farmers were unfamiliar with irrigation prac-
tices; and until the railroads reached the rural areas, most farms had poor
31. Friedman, A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames, 38 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 1-12
(1971). See Runge, Common Property Externalities: Isolation, Assurance, and Resource Depletion
in a Traditional Grazing Context, 63 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 595 (1981) for a model of the common
pool that does not require enforcement mechanisms.
32. Axelrod, Effective Choice in the Prisoners'Dilemma, 24 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 3-25 (1980);
Axelrod, The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists, 75 AM. POL. Sd. REV. 306-18 (198 1).
33. See M. TAYLOR, ANARCHY AND COOPERATION (1976).
34. See Anderson, Burt, & Fractor, Privatizing Groundwater Basins: A Model and its Application,
in WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 223-48
(T. Anderson ed. 1983).
35. Vanderwork v. Hewes, 15 N.M. 439, 10 P. 567 (1910).
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access to markets, so that cash income from crops was marginal. The
large investment and high operating costs of pump-irrigation were beyond
the means of most farmers. The policy problem in percolating ground-
water before the 1930s was not excessive use, but getting farmers to use
percolating groundwater at all.
There is another type of groundwater, the artesian aquifer. In the Ros-
well basin of the Pecos River Valley, a water-bearing layer of San Andres
limestone begins near the crest of the Sacramento Mountains and falls
eastwards to the Pecos River. The limestone is overlaid by relatively
impermeable clay, sand, and gravel, so that the water in the limestone
is under hydrostatic pressure." Before the development of the Pecos
Valley, water in a well drilled deep enough to reach the water-bearing
rock would rise under pressure to 3,568 feet above sea level, rising above
the ground in a great geyser.37 In 1891, when the artesian field was first
discovered, there was water under pressure beneath about 663 square
miles in Chaves and Eddy counties.38
Once discovered, the artesian field developed rapidly. Before 1900
there were 108 wells in Chaves and Eddy counties, most providing water
for domestic supplies, gardens, and lawns. Between 1901 and 1905, 256
more wells were drilled in the two counties, most of which were for
irrigation; between 1906 and 1910, 583 additional wells were drilled,
again mostly for irrigation.39 In addition to growing in number, the wells
grew in size. The first wells in the area were 4-6 inches in diameter; most
of those drilled after 1905 were 8 inches in diameter; after 1920, 10-inch
to 12'/2 inch wells were drilled.4' By 1925, 45,000 acres in Chaves and
Eddy counties were irrigated with water from artesian wells, as compared
with 13,200 acres irrigated with surface water.4 About 150,000 acre-feet
a year of the artesian water was used to irrigate crops. In addition, about
25,000 acre-feet of water flowed to waste from the uncapped wells; an
unassessed quantity was lost underground from improperly lined wells.42
The Roswell basin became a prosperous agricultural community on the
basis of its flowing wells. By 1920, the value of annual crop production
from artesian waters was about $3 million.43 The tremendous drain on
the pressurized resource caused pressures to drop, however, and wells
began to fail. Many farmers on the western edge of the basin either
abandoned their farms or installed expensive pumps. By 1926, the esti-
36. 9 BIENNIAL REP. STATE ENGINEER OF N.M. 394-96 (1929-30).
37. 8 BIENNIAL REP. STATE ENGINEER OF N.M. 91 (1926-28).
38. 8 BIENNIAL REP. STATE ENGINEER OF N.M. 99 (1926-28).
39. 7 BIENNIAL REP. STATE ENGINEER OF N.M. 29 (1925-26).
40. 7 BIENNIAL REP. STATE ENGINEER OF N.M. 28-29 (1925-26).
41. 7 BIENNIAL REP. STATE ENGINEER OF N.M. 47 (1925-26).
42. 7 BIENNIAL REP. STATE ENGINEER OF N.M. 51 (1925-26).
43. 7 BIENNIAL REP. STATE ENGINEER OF N.M. 56 (1925-26).
October 1985]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
mated loss of investment in wells and pumping equipment on the western
edge was in excess of $2 million, with an additional $3 million lost in
abandoned land, farm buildings, and improvements. 4 At the same time,
farmland near the Pecos River became saturated with waste water from
artesian wells and drainage districts were organized. 45 By 1916, the area
of flow had fallen from 663 to 599 square miles. By 1925, it had fallen
to 425 square miles.46
Next to water, farmers are most interested in credit. When the prices
of farm outputs began to fall after the first World War, all American farmers
were hard-pressed to meet their credit obligations and maintain their
production. In 1916, Congress passed the Federal Farm Loan Act, which
created the Federal Land Bank system to provide loans to the rural sector.47
When the Pecos Valley communities of Roswell, Orchard Park, Dexter,
Hagerman and Artesia formed loan associations and approached the Wich-
ita Federal Land Bank for credit, they were turned down. The appraisal
team reported that the "artesian flow ...is gradually failing, a large
part of the cultivated land is badly seeped. . .It would seem inadvisable
at this time to consider long-term loans in this district." 48
The Roswell situation was a classic prisoners' dilemma. The homo-
geneity criterion, that all resource-users be in equivalent positions with
respect to the external costs imposed by the use of others, was not perfectly
satisfied, since wells in some areas were failing much more quickly than
wells in others, but the dramatic threat of falling pressures tended to
equalize the urgency felt by farmers. Moreover, the refusal of credit was
an external cost which applied to all farmers in the basin, those whose
wells had already stopped flowing as well as those who still had pressure.
The Roswell community, acting largely through its Chamber of Com-
merce, went directly to the institutional problem underlying their diffi-
culties with the resource. As early as 1905, Roswell representatives sought,
and achieved, state regulations over waste from artesian wells. 49 These
regulations were widely ignored, and were revised and strengthened in
1909, 1912, and 1925." 0 Artesian pressures continued to decline and the
Federal Land Bank continued to refuse credit. 51 The policing and en-
forcement requirements of the regulatory approach to the prisoners' di-
lemma appeared to be too high to cause a significant reversal of the
degradation of the aquifer's productivity.
44. 9 BIENNIAL REP. STATE ENGINEER OF N.M. 597 (1929-30).
45. 8 BIENNIAL REP. STATE ENGINEER OF N.M. 103 (1926-28).
46. 8 BIENNIAL REP. STATE ENGINEER OF N.M. 99 (1926-28).
47. Federal Farm Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. § 641 (1983) (repealed 1971).
48. Report by J. Kerr and W.A. Kelly (Mar. 28, 1918), quoted in R. DUNBAR, supra note 3, at
164.
49. 1905 N.M. Laws 45.
50. 1909 N.M. Laws 177; 1912 N.M. Laws 159; 1925 N.M. Laws 151.
51. DUNBAR, supra note 3, at 164-65.
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The Roswell Chamber of Commerce, working closely with Albert
Fiedler, the United States Geological Survey engineer appointed to study
the basin, looked for a more effective collective solution2 Under the
absolute ownership groundwater regime which delegated unlimited pump-
ing privilege to landowners, the destabilizing forces acting on the pris-
oners' dilemma relation would pull any regulatory scheme apart. Even if
conservation measures could be enforced, any improvement in the re-
source as a result of conservation would immediately be lost to new wells.
In 1926, when Fiedler and the Roswell farmers tried to find a solution,
Fiedler observed to his superior at U.S.G.S., "the only type of legislation
which may be of help seems to be that of placing the ground water under
the same rulings for appropriation as surface water.""
This in fact is precisely what the final Roswell plan did. The bill
introduced in the New Mexico legislature on March 7, 1927, declared
New Mexican groundwaters to be the property of the public and subject
to appropriation for beneficial uses under the existing laws of New Mexico
relating to appropriations from surface streams. 4 In order to reassure
agricultural interests in areas where currently unappropriated non-artesian
groundwater was expected to be an important source of irrigation water
in the future, the provisions of the law were restricted to apply to "un-
derground streams, channels, artesian basins, reservoirs, or lakes, the
boundaries of which may be reasonably ascertained by scientific inves-
tigations or surface indications.""
Introduced to the New Mexico legislature in 1927, the groundwater
bill passed. The Federal Land Bank refused to resurvey the basin until
the constitutionality of the new groundwater law was confirmed by the
courts.56 In order to test the law, John Tweedy, a member of the Roswell
Chamber of Commerce, announced his intention to drill a well in violation
of the statute, and Herman Yeo, the State Engineer, sued to enjoin him.
On appeal the statute was found to be declaratory of existing law and
fundamentally sound, but unconstitutional because of a structural defect.57
In 1931 the senator from Chaves County sponsored a bill which answered
the court's technical concerns. After considerable debate this time, it was
passed. 8 New Mexico pumpers have, since that time, had a prior ap-
propriation property right in their groundwater, and a basin can and will
be closed to new pumping when the rights of existing pumpers are threat-
ened by new drilling.
52. Id. at 165-66.
53. Quoted in Dunbar, Pioneering Groundwater Legislation in the United States: Mortgages,
Land Banks and Institution-Building in New Mexico, 47 PAC. HIST. REV. 565, 574 (1978).
54. 1927 N.M. Laws 450.
55. Id.
56. Dunbar, supra note 53, at 576.
57. Yeo v. Tweedy, 34 N.M. 611, 286 P. 970 (1930).
58. 1931 N.M. Laws 229.
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Neither the artesian pressure problem nor the credit problems were
automatically solved. Waste from abandoned wells continued to deplete
the resource, and a conservancy district with the power to tax and carry
out a well-plugging program was created.59 Well-plugging technology
was undeveloped and an appropriation was secured for the State Engineer
to develop replicable low-cost technologies for plugging wells.' Collec-
tive activity on the local and locally-motivated state level was intense
throughout the thirties, and has continued to be very high. The basin was
closed to new appropriations on August 21, 1931 to protect the established
rights against impairment by new wells.6
Adjudication proceedings began in 1956, in the Fifth Judicial District,
Chaves County. The suit involved about 2000 water users and was the
largest suit in the history of New Mexico courts.62 Meters were ordered
in 1967, and an annual water duty of 3 acre-feet per acre per year was
set to support the established rights against impingement from existing
wells .63 Salinity problems were encountered in the 1950s, and have per-
sisted since that time, abating for a period as the conservancy district
finds an approach to retard saline encroachment, and becoming more
serious when prices or drought increase pumping activity.64 Water prob-
lems continue to plague the Roswell basin, due to the pressure of a thirsty
community on a limited resource. The community has, however, given
rise to an impressive array of institutional solutions to their water prob-
lems, not least among these the prior appropriation system of groundwater
management.
Prior appropriation, as it applies to New Mexican groundwater, is a
modified system of private property right in groundwater. The right-holder
does not have a right in the stock of water in the aquifer, but a right to
withdraw an amount of water each year for a particular use. 6 When the
right-holder wants to alter the use or to transfer the right, the proposed
59. 1931 N.M. Laws 156
60. 1931 N.M. Laws 119.
61. 10 BIENNIAL REP. STATE ENGINEER OF N.M. 302 (1930-31).
62. State ex rel Reynolds v. Lewis and State ex rel Reynolds v. Hagerman Canal Co., Chaves
County, Cause No. 20294 and 22600, consolidated (1956).
63. 17 BIENNIAL REP. STATE ENGINEER OF N.M. 11 (1964-65).
64. Salinity problems are first mentioned in 22 BIENNIAL REP. STATE ENGINEER OF N.M. 220
(1954-56); proposals to stop the enlargement of the saline areas are discussed in 24 BIENNIAL REP.
STATE ENGINEEa OF N.M. 74 (1958-60); transfers of rights out of the saline areas in 25 BIENNIAL
REP. STATE ENGINEER OF N.M. 7 (1960-62) and 26 BIENNIAL REP. STATE ENGINEER OF N.M. 8
(1962-64); City of Roswell retiring rights to counter the salinity effects of new wells in 28 BIENNIAL
REP. STATE ENGINEER OF N.M. 12 (1966-68); and improvements in salinity levels when well-metering
reduced the drawdown in pressure in 29 BIENNIAL REP. STATE ENGINEER OF N.M. 12 (1968-70).
65. The prior appropriation right to surface waters is a right to divert a fixed quantity from a
seasonal flow. When this right was extended to groundwaters, the right continued to be defined as
a fixed annual quantity. In New Mexico, adjustments were made for mining situations, where pumping
exceeds recharge, by cutting off appropriations where annual pumping rates would deplete the
economically recoverable water stock in a forty year period. This practice was affirmed in Mathers
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change is investigated by the State Engineer to determine whether it will
cause damage to third parties.66 The definition of the groundwater right
as an annual claim rather than as a defined property right in the ground-
water stock was necessary because the problem in Roswell was not the
future scarcity cost of too-rapid mining of the stock, but the immediate
cost of too-heavy annual demands on the artesian pressure, or the under-
provision of the public good "pressure."
Fortuitously, prior appropriation proved to be an admirable rule for
mining nonpressurized low-recharge percolating groundwater resources
as well. In these basins, the increase in pumping costs due to declines
in the stock, or the under-provision of the public good provided by the
stock in holding the water close to the surface, make up a large part of
the excessive social costs of the common pool. This external cost is not
internalized by quantifying property rights in the stock, since even when
rights are quantified, water pumped today is cheaper to pump than water
pumped in the future. In general, while the future scarcity cost is inter-
nalized by fully defined private property rights, reducing the social costs
of under-provision of public goods requires some form of collective agree-
ment.67
Roswell is an example of creative institutional response to the prisoners'
dilemma facing users of a common pool. Roswell irrigators, however,
were helped by the fact that their crisis arose early, at a time when farmers
with artesian irrigation wells were the only powerful interests who cared
about groundwater rules enough to dedicate a significant amount of their
resources and power to affect the rules. Roswell irrigators were further
helped by the near-term effects of the drop in pressure. There was no
intertemporal negotiation occurring in Roswell between present users and
those who expected to be future users.
Pump-irrigators, in contrast, face long-run rather than near-term losses
to the common-pool externality. Over a longer horizon, differences in the
physical and economic situation of users of the pumped resource become
more divisive. Pumpers over deep sections of the aquifer expect to be
able to pump much longer than those who pump over a thin layer of the
aquifer. Present users, like farmers, are in an advantageous situation
relative to future users, such as cities. The difference in expected costs
and benefits due to differences in site and in time of demand tend to
increase the distributional effects of rule change, making institutional
innovation more difficult.
v. Texaco, 77 N.M. 239, 246,421 P.2d 771, 777 (1966). A system for defining completely privatized
rights in the stock has been proposed by Vernon L. Smith in Smith, Water Deeds: A Proposed
Solution to the Water Valuation Problem, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 8 (1977).
66. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§75-5-23, 75-11-7 (1953).
67. M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTION ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS
(1965).
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Texas
This was the case for the High Plains of Texas. The Texas panhandle
overlies the southern edge of the great Ogallala aquifer, a groundwater
resource that extends from southern South Dakota to Texas, underlying
parts of South Dakota, Nebraska, Wyoming, Colorado, Kansas, Okla-
homa, New Mexico and Texas.68 The Ogallala is not a pressurized aquifer,
so that growth in groundwater irrigation on the Ogallala had to wait for
the development of the deep-well turbine pump.69 Consequently, Texas
faced its common-pool problems several decades after New Mexico did.
In 1929, when Roswell farmers were waiting for the court's decision
in Yeo v. Tweedy, there were only 7,384 irrigated acres on the 39 counties
of the Texas High Plains overlying the Ogallala aquifer.7' By 1945, when
urban and conservationist interest groups in Texas began to press for a
change in the absolute ownership rule, 7' there were more than 390,000
irrigated acres in the same area,72 and the water level in the aquifer had
not yet begun to decline.73 In 1945, High Plains farmers were irrigating
less than 8 percent of the acreage they would eventually bring under the
pump. 74 They were not willing to give up any discretionary authority over
the use of their water. They had too many undeveloped acres that could
be made valuable with irrigation.
The dryland acreage of the High Plains did not remain undeveloped
for long. By 1949, the year after Texas farmers won the battle for control
over groundwater by getting a Texas groundwater statute passed that
confirmed absolute ownership and guaranteed only local regulation at
local option,75 over 1.5 million acres were irrigated on the Panhandle.76
Irrigated acreage more than doubled in the next ten years, reaching nearly
3.7 million acres by 1959. 77
As irrigated acreage and pumping for irrigation rose, the water levels
in the aquifer fell. By 1958 over 86 percent of the land irrigated on the
High Plains had been moderately to severely affected by water level
declines. 78 The effects of the decline in water levels were manifested in
68. See WATER INFO. CENTER, THE WATER ENCYCLOPEDIA 187-91 (D. Todd, ed. 1970).
69. See D. GREEN, LAND OF THE UNDERGROUND RAIN: IRRIGATION ON THE HIGH PLAINS 1910-
1970 (1973), Ch. 4-8, for a history of pump irrigation on the High Plains.
70. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Irrigation of Agricultural Lands, in
FIFTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES 172-78 (1930).
71. Green, supra note 69.
72. 1 U.S. CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE: 1945, Part 26 (1946).
73. Hughes & McGee, Some Economic Effects of Adjusting to a Changing Water Supply, Texas
High Plains, TEXAS AG. Exp. STA. BULL. 966 (1960) [hereinafter cited as TAES BULL.].
74. In 1979, 4,506,893 acres were irrigated on the High Plains. U.S. CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE
1982.
75. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. Ch. 52 (Vernon 1985).
76. i U.S. CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE: 1954, Part 26 (1955).
77. 1 U.S. CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE: 1964, Part 37 (1965).
78. TAES BULL. 966 at 1. 64 percent of the acres irrigated in 1958 were moderately affected,
20 percent were seriously affected, and 2.3 percent were severely affected.
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several ways. Well yields fell, so that each well could irrigate fewer acres.
On the "moderately" affected lands (64 percent of the total), the number
of acres irrigated per well fell as much as 34 percent in some subregions
between 1947 and 1958.' 9 The need for more and deeper wells and
stronger pumps drove investment costs up. Per-acre investment in irri-
gation facilities rose between 200-300 percent in this moderately affected
area."0 Finally, operating costs rose, since more fuel is needed by a low-
yield well pumping from a greater depth. Between 1954 and 1958, op-
erating costs rose between 25 and 62 percent on the moderately affected
farms.
81
An additional fifth of the irrigated land on the High Plains was still
worse off, considered to be "seriously affected" by water level declines
by 1958.2 Here, in addition to increases in irrigation costs, land had
begun to go out of irrigation. Many sub-areas in this classification suffered
a 7-10 percent per farm decrease in irrigated acreage between 1954 and
1958." 3
Recall that there are two sources of external costs in groundwater
pumping from a common pool, the increased operating and investment
costs as stocks decline, an underprovision of public goods problem, and
the sluffing-off of future scarcity costs. The public good problem requires
a collective solution, while the disregard of future scarcity costs may be
internalized either by privatization or by regulation.
Taking these two types of costs in turn, we find first that High Plains
farmers have been active and interested in reducing the costs of increased
depths to water since the 1950s. The High Plains has not taken a regu-
lation-and-enforcement approach to water conservation, choosing instead
to provide itself with technical support and public education. 4 The pre-
79. Id. at 23-25. Percentage declines in acres irrigated per well ranged from 11 percent to 34
percent in the moderately affected region.
80. Id. The lowest increase in investments in additional wells, closed distribution systems, low-
ering pumps, and installing natural gas lines was from $23 per acre in 1947 to $58 per acre in 1958;
the highest was from $26 per acre in 1947 to $72 per acre in 1958.
81. Id. Changes in operating costs have been adjusted for seasonal differences and changes in
the price of fuels.
82. Id. at 25-26. In the severely affected region, water-conserving irrigation practices, especially
closed distribution systems and every-other-row irrigation, have masked some of the effects of water
declines. Acres irrigated per well fell between three percent and 61 percent; investment costs rose
between 20 percent and 280 percent; operating costs approached the upper limits of economic
feasibility in some subregions.
83. Id. at 26.
84. The creed of the High Plains Underground Water Conservation District No. 2 is: "Dedicated
to the Principle that Water Conservation Is Best Accomplished Through Public Education." The
North Plains Water Conservation District No. 2 asserts: "The public education and participation
programs are viewed as the most important function of the District and as an effective method of
managing water." The Panhandle Underground Water Conservation District No. 3 says of its public
information program that it is "probably the most important function of the District. High Plains
Assoc., Six-State High Plains Ogallala Aquifer Regional Resources Study Element B-6, Institutional
Assessment B-90, B-97 (Mar. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Institutional Assessment].
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dominant groundwater institution on the High Plains is the Underground
Water Conservation District, authorized by the 1948 bill that endorsed
absolute ownership as the law of Texas groundwater.8 5 These districts
(there are three which are currently active) 86 provide a public information
service, develop conservation technology, provide geologic information
on the state of the resource, and have some minor regulatory functions."
The districts see themselves as service agencies with a highly motivated
clientele rather than as enforcement agencies. Describing the economic
incentives used by the district to carry out its management objectives,
Wayne Wyatt, the General Manager of the High Plains Underground Water
Conservation District No. 1, states: "Economic benefits are derived from
voluntary adoption of conservation practices and procedures developed
through common effort and assimilated by the District's education pro-
grams. ",88 The districts appear to find these voluntary incentives adequate
to meet their goals. Mr. Wyatt continues:
The effectiveness of the Water District's public education and in-
formation program is probably best reflected by the efficiency of the
average irrigator in the High Plains of Texas. The U.S. Department
of Agriculture has published information that the High Plains of Texas
irrigator is the most efficient water conservationist in the United
States, achieving an average efficiency in excess of 65 percent.8 9
The districts perform some coordinating functions by requiring permits
to drill or expand production from wells, which are granted according to
well-spacing standards to minimize interference between wells." In ad-
dition, they encourage reuse of waste waters, concentrating on technical
support and public education, but occasionally using their powers to
enjoin wasteful practices. 9 In general, the district's few regulations are
of a type which are cost effective for irrigators, and will be followed
voluntarily.92
One would expect voluntary compliance to be an inadequate motivation
85. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. Ch. 52 (Vernon 1985).
86. The High Plains Underground Water Conservation District No. 1, the North Plains Water
Conservation District No. 2, and the Panhandle Underground Water Conservation District No. 3.
87. Rayner, Groundwater Basin Management on the High Plains of Texas, 10 GROUNDWATER 12
(1972).
88. Institutional Assessment, supra note 84, at B-81.
89. Id. at B-84.
90. See Rayner, supra note 87.
91. Id.
92. Well-spacing regulations, in general, benefit all wells involved by minimizing the effects of
the cones of depression formed by a well during the irrigation season. The tailwater pumping
regulations are marginally cost-effective. Pumping costs from the playa lakes formed by tailwaters
are from 10 to 15 percent of groundwater pumping costs, but investment costs may drive the cost
of tailwaters above that of groundwaters. Institutional Assessment, supra note 84, at B-80.
[Vol. 25
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND GROUNDWATER
for High Plains farmers to conserve water at the level that is best for
them collectively if they are in a prisoners' dilemma. There is a special
situation, however, where voluntary compliance may be enough. A farm-
er's efforts to conserve water on a mined aquifer produce both private
and public benefits. High water-utilization efficiency produces private
benefits by reducing pumping costs. Since when less water must be taken
out of the aquifer, more water is left in the aquifer, higher efficiencies
also result in increases in the groundwater stock. Additions to the water
stock produce a public good by reducing both pumping and investment
costs. This is the public good which is under-provided on the common
pool. If private benefits are large enough to encourage conservation prac-
tices at the limit of existing technology, voluntary compliance would be
consistent with full provision of the public good. If this is so, the public
good will be provided incidentally as an external benefit.93 A comparison
of West Texas with the Roswell basin, where artesian pressure was the
under-provided public good, may help to illustrate the difference. In
Roswell, there was no private benefit from conservation. On the contrary,
capping and casing wells to reduce waste was costly. The only way
Roswell farmers could collectively self-provide artesian pressures was
through a non-voluntary public scheme.
This leaves the common pool problem of neglect of future scarcity
costs. No matter how efficiently Texas irrigators are using their water
today, it might be better for them not to be using it today at all, but to
be saving it for tomorrow instead. The conclusion that a common pool
will result in inefficiently high future scarcity costs is based on an as-
sumption of diminishing returns. To illustrate, suppose that in a year of
average rainfall, a dryland crop yields 1400 pounds/acre, and a six-inch
irrigation would increase yields to 2000 pounds/acre, a ten-inch irrigation
to 2200 pounds/acre and a twelve- inch irrigation to 2250 pounds/acre.
In this situation, a common pool pumper would use twelve inches to
irrigate since each of the last two inches gives a 25 pound increment in
per acre yields. However, if those two inches were saved for a future
year when there would otherwise be no water with which to irrigate, they
would each produce 100 pounds of yield. Since common pool irrigators
cannot save the water for future use, they sacrifice 100 pounds of crop
in the future for 25 pounds today. This is the reasoning behind the assertion
that water is being used "too fast" on the common pool.
However, the major High Plains crops, sorghum and cotton, give con-
stant yields per acre-inch of water over the irrigation levels practiced on
the High Plains. That is, the last acre-inch is just as productive as the
93. This is the case described by M. OLSON, supra note 67, at 49-50, as a "privileged group,"
or one which has a member(s) that will self-provide a public good on the basis of internal costs and
benefits alone.
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first acre-inch.94 Given this production fact, the value of water used in
irrigation is higher today than at any future date for any nonzero time-
discount rate.
It is, however, expected that there will be higher-valued uses for West
Texas groundwater outside of the agricultural sector in the future, such
as municipal and industrial uses. From the point of view of farmers, the
future demand on the part of other sectors is a threat to the security of
agricultural claims on water. High Plains agriculturalists have been aware
of this threat at least since the 1940s, and alert to protect their authority
to control High Plains groundwater use, which rests on the absolute
ownership rule. 9'
The rural share in High Plains population has fallen from 55 percent
in 1940 to 23 percent in 1980.96 Under most regulatory systems the
growing urban population would have a growing influence on the distri-
bution of water in the region. Under absolute ownership, the acre "votes,"
since any acre may be pumped. The number of acres in farms has only
declined 3.4 percent between 1949 and 1982. 9' In 1948, High Plains
irrigators successfully resisted an attempt by policy makers concerned
with future urban supplies to modify the absolute ownership rule in Texas. 98
Since that time, irrigators have successfully resisted the creation of any
regulatory authority, even on the local level, that could limit rates of
pumping or irrigated acreage." If it is true, as argued above, that serious
intertemporal inefficiencies do not exist within irrigated agriculture, then
regulation for intertemporal improvements can only mean a redistribution
of water from the rural to the urban sector.
To summarize, West Texas pump-irrigators did not look to institutional
change to solve their common pool problems as the irrigators on the New
Mexican artesian basin did. The reasons that Texans took a technical
rather than an institutional approach can be found in both the social and
the physical differences between the regions. Texas irrigators were pro-
tecting their water claims against the competing claims of urban and
94. See Swanson & Thaxton, Jr., Requirements for Grain Sorghum Irrigation on the High Plains,
TEX. AG. ExP. STA. BULL. 846 (Jan. 1957), and Thaxton, Jr. & Swanson, Guides to Cotton Irrigation
on the High Plains, TAES Bull. 838 (Sept. 1956).
95. Green, supra note 69, at 171-79.
96. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF CENSUS, SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED
STATES (1940); DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF CENSUS, TWENTIETH CENSUS OF THE UNITED
STATES (1980).
97. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE (1954); 1 DEPARTMENT OF AGRI-
CULTURE, CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE (1982).
98. Green, supra note 69, at 177-78 .
99. An extreme version of the West Texas view of regulation was succinctly put by T.L. Wright
at a hearing on the establishment of the first Underground Water Conservation District. Wright said:
"You can say you prefer local control to state control or federal control. I don't want any control
by anybody but the land owner. That's like asking who you'd rather be hanged by. I don't want to
be hanged." Quoted in Green, supra note 69, at 182.
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industrial interests, and they clung to the rule that gave agriculture the
most authority. Within the agricultural sector, rising costs themselves
provided what Texans believed to be adequate incentive to conserve water.
This belief is supported by the extensive substitution of capital and tech-
nology for water on the High Plains, where there is widespread use of
closed-conduit irrigation systems, alternate-row and sprinkler irrigation
systems, and the use of irrigation scheduling schemes that conserve water."
For cotton and sorghum, the most important irrigated crops in the region,
the absence of diminishing returns over commonly practiced irrigation
levels suggests that farmers' returns over time would not be collectively
improved by restricting irrigation levels of each farmer. That is, among
themselves, farmers may very well not be in a prisoners' dilemma. In
addition, regulation threatens a loss of flexibility in adjusting to climate
and price changes which could be costly for farmers.
If the future scarcity cost of present irrigation is paid by West Texas
cities and not by farmers, and the external costs within agriculture are
as low as West Texans think they are, the maintenance of the "inefficient"
absolute ownership property rule satisfies the distribution-of-benefits con-
dition governing rule change. In such a situation, an alternative rule that
would conserve water for the future high-valued uses outside the rural
sector would have to provide farmers at least as much as absolute own-
ership does. No such rule was proposed on the High Plains.
CONCLUSION
No property system will be adopted which injures interested parties
who are powerful enough, through their command over economic, social,
or political factors, to keep it from being adopted. Nor is there any sense
in which it "should" be adopted. It is no more reasonable to say that
West Texas irrigators "should" accept a groundwater management system
they will not accept than to assert that water "should" run uphill because
it would be socially beneficial for it to do so. What can be done, from
an objective point of view, is to identify the limits of the necessary
distribution-of-benefits, and to attempt to make improvements that satisfy
those parameters. From an adversarial point of view, if one wishes to
defend urban claims or the claims of future generations, one may look
for ways to diminish the bargaining power of groups that are effective to
prevent or promote rule changes that conflict with one's advocacy goals.
It is, of course, perfectly legitimate to support measures that will over-
come the effectiveness of agriculture in blocking rule change, for ex-
ample. One may not, however, justify one's support by calling on efficiency.
100. See TAES Bull. 966, supra note 73.
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Economic theory that puts efficiency above the distributional require-
ments of the social situation it addresses is doomed to be ignored by
policy makers. In order to identify relevant economic improvements in
resource use, economics must consider distribution not from the per-
spective of equity, but from the perspective of feasibility.
